Analysis: Special pensions are not the problem, but rather the way the state uses taxpayers' money

In an analysis published on 10 July 2026, forensic accountant and auditor Daniel Udrescu argues that the public debate about special pensions, which has been ongoing for over a decade, rests on a false premise. He notes that public opinion has grown accustomed to believing that certain professional categories receive excessively high pensions, but considers this to be a "false target".

According to Udrescu, the real issue — with constitutional implications — is the way in which the state manages the contributory assets of all citizens. His reasoning is as follows: every taxpayer transfers a portion of their personal assets to the social insurance budget on a monthly basis. From that point on, these individual assets become part of the collective patrimony of social solidarity, managed exclusively by the state. Upon retirement, the individual receives back a patrimony determined according to rules likewise imposed by the state.

The author raises a central question: can the state collect assets of a certain economic value and then, after 35 or 40 years, return assets whose real value is significantly lower? He stresses that this question applies to all contributors, regardless of whether it concerns a contributory pension (the general system) or a service pension (the so-called special pensions).

According to the analysis, the assets returned upon retirement are substantially eroded by three factors: inflation accumulated throughout an entire career, the absence of any return on the capital transferred to the state, and repeated changes to the rules governing pension calculations.

With specific reference to magistrates, Udrescu points out that they too have contributed to the public social insurance system, and that their contributory assets have been absorbed into the social solidarity system in the same way as everyone else's. The difference compared to retirees in the general system lies, the author argues, solely in the fact that the legislature established a more favourable restitution mechanism for magistrates — meaning that a greater proportion of their contributory assets is returned to them than is the case with ordinary pensions.

The author highlights a paradox: rather than attempting to compensate the losses borne by millions of retirees in the general system, the proposed reform moves in the direction of reducing the assets returned to magistrates, bringing them closer to the already diminished level of ordinary pensions. In this way, Udrescu argues, the state does not eliminate the inequity between categories but instead uniformises the loss at a lower level for everyone, effectively compounding the problem.

The analysis concludes that the real issue is not the existence of service pensions as such — which, in the author's view, simply represent the category in which the reduction of returned assets is smaller than for other contributors. The reform under discussion, he argues, seeks to narrow even this remaining difference, without addressing the underlying problem.

From Daniel Udrescu's perspective, the genuine constitutional question is not whether special pensions are too large, but whether the state has the right to convert the private assets of each citizen into collective assets and then return to everyone an economic value lower than what was originally received, retaining the difference. The author contends that, for as long as the answer to this question remains affirmative, the public debate about special pensions conceals the true issue: the constitutional limits on the state's power over each citizen's contributory assets, rather than the privileges of any particular professional category.